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Evaluating the Effectiveness  of
Conservation Water-Pricing Programs
R. Huffaker, N. Whittlesey,  A. Michelsen,
R. Taylor, and T. McGuckin
Charging farmers  increasing block prices for irrigation deliveries is advocated as a
means of encouraging agricultural water conservation in the West. We formulate a
model  of a hypothetical  irrigated  river  basin  to investigate  the  hydro-economic
circumstances  in which such pricing leads to water conservation.  Our results indi-
cate that increasing delivery prices may encourage irrigators to make adjustments
with countervailing  impacts on consumptive water use and conservation.  Whether
these countervailing impacts combine to conserve water or increase its consumptive
use must be resolved empirically.  An alternative resolution of this ambiguity is to
assess water prices in terms of consumptive use.
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Introduction
The  presumption  that increasing  block  water  prices  encourage  agricultural  water
conservation  is firmly entrenched  in much of western water policy (U.S.  Bureau of
Reclamation;  Willey  and  Diamant).  We  formulate  a  hydro-economic  model  of  a
hypothetical irrigated river basin to test this presumption under a variety of hydrologic
circumstances.
Water Demand Management
The era of expanding increasingly contested water supplies in the western United States
via large-scale and federally subsidized water development projects has ended. Principal
reasons are political opposition to enlarged budget deficits and environmental opposition
to adverse ecological impacts associated with the operation of water collection, storage,
and transportation facilities (Gould). Consequently, irrigation districts receiving feder-
ally subsidized water are under increasing pressure from the federal government to
engage in "water demand management" to conserve water used in agriculture. Water
demand management refers to "the integrated use of conservation practices and pricing
to influence water use-both the total level of water use and the pattern of use" (U.S.
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Bureau of  Reclamation, p. 10). Western states such as Washington also are investigating
the use of water demand management to encourage agricultural water conservation by
state irrigation districts (Willey and Diamant).
Willey  and  Diamant,  co-authors  of  an  Environmental  Defense  Fund  water
conservation  study  commissioned  by the state  of Washington,  developed  the tiered
pricing model reproduced in figure  1 to demonstrate how water demand management
purportedly  leads  to  water  savings  in irrigated  agriculture.  The  pricing  structure
charges increasing block prices for water delivered and applied  to crops.  Such tiered
pricing structures  are becoming increasingly  common in the West (Michelsen  et al.).
Irrigation districts in the Central Valley of California are required by the Central Valley
Project  Improvement  Act to adopt water conservation  plans including tiered pricing
structures,1 and the federal government encourages  districts in other areas to do so
(U.S. Bureau of Reclamation).
The first tier in figure  1 prices water  deliveries  from  an irrigation  district  to an
irrigator at point P(l), which is in units of dollars per acre-foot of water ($/AF). The first
tier covers  deliveries up to tiering level  T(1),  which  is in units of acre-feet  per acre
(AF/A). The first tier price can be set to ensure that water delivery costs are recovered
if farmers complete  seasonal irrigations with first tier water only.  The  second tier is
priced somewhat higher at P(2), and covers water deliveries between tiering levels T(1)
and T(2). Finally, the third tier is priced yet higher at P(3), and covers water deliveries
beyond T(2).  Willey and Diamant assume that the third tier price is set to equate the
irrigator's  marginal  value  product  of delivered  water  in  irrigation  to the  district's
marginal supply cost to encourage economically efficient water applications.
Based on their investigation, Willey  and Diamant contend that the tiered pricing
structure in figure  1 leads to agricultural water conservation in the following way: Let
P(1) represent  traditional  "flat rate" pricing  water  deliveries in  a  single  block at  a
relatively low rate. Each irrigator in the district demands a water delivery of Q(1). If the
district subsequently adopts the tiered pricing scheme in figure  1, then each irrigator
is  assessed  P(3)  for  the  tier including  the  previous  demanded  delivery,  Q(1).  The
increased water price  encourages  each irrigator to reduce  his/her demand for water
deliveries to the economically efficient level, Q(3). The difference, Q(1) - Q(3), is referred
to as a "tier-induced reduction," and is presumed to measure water savings (p. 80). The
authors conclude that "[the effectiveness of  tiered prices] in reducing water consumption
depends on how sensitive the users are to price increases-in other words,  on the price
elasticity of demand" (Willey and Diamant, Executive  Summary, p. iii).  In summary,
increasing block water prices encourage each farm to reduce its demand for delivered
water to an extent which depends on its price elasticity of demand, and the tier-induced
reduction is presumed to constitute water savings.
In the following section, we formulate a hydro-economic model of a hypothetical irri-
gated river basin to demonstrate how this common presumption of tier-induced water
conservation is oversimpified. The presumption of conservation disregards the counter-
vailing  water supply  impacts  of adjustments  in on-farm irrigation  efficiencies  that
farmers also have been observed to make in response to increasing block water rates
(Wichelns; Wichelns and Cone).
143 U.S.C.  § 390jj(b).






Source: Willey and Diamant (fig.  24).
Figure 1.  Marginal cost-based  tiered water pricing
A Hypothetical  Irrigated River Basin Model
Consider a single irrigation district delivering water over a fixed irrigation season to
equally productive farms located along a river of constant depth and within a basin of
constant width. Each farm produces  the same  single crop with an identical on-farm
irrigation efficiency, E, determining the fraction of delivered water consumed in crop
production,  C (AF/A), according to:
(1)  C = EQ,
where  0  < E  <  1, and Q  (AF/A) continues  to represent delivered  water (Whittlesey,
McNeal, and Obersinner).
Since  on-farm  irrigation  efficiency  is typically  less  than  100%,  crop  production
depends on consumptive water use C, and not solely on water deliveries Q as in figure
1 (Chakravorty,  Hochman, and Zilberman).  The crop production function, Y = F(C), is
characterized  by a positive and decreasing marginal product, i.e., Fc > 0,  and Fcc < 0.
Consequently,  each profit-maximizing  farm faces  a derived demand for consumptive
water use of:
PyF (C)  = P
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where Py is the unit price of the crop, and P continues to represent the cost of delivered
water.
To model the impact of irrigation deliveries and consumptive use on the quantity of
water in the river at a given location, we  modify a volumetric stream  flow equation
found  in the literature  (Chakravorty,  Hochman,  and Zilberman)  by introducing the
possibility of irrigation return flows. Let x represent the distance from the point at
which water initially flows into the river basin (x =  ) to a point at which the irrigation
district delivers water to a given farm. In addition, let W  represent the level of instream
flows at distance marker x for a fixed irrigation season. Then the spatial rate of change
in the quantity of instream flows at x is given by:
(3)  W'(x)  = -Qxa  + 6(Qx  - CX)a,
where W'(x)  is in units of acre-feet of water per unit distance x, and a measures the
constant width of the irrigated river basin. The parameter 0 < 6 < 1 is set to reflect a
range of exogenous hydrologic  cononditions.  If  = 0, then the difference  between water
application and consumptive water use is irretrievably lost to the river basin (i.e., as in
an "open" hydrologic system). If 6 = 1, then the difference returns to the river as an irri-
gation return flow (i.e., as in a "closed" hydrologic system). Finally, a value of 6 between
O  and 1 represents a range of intermediate cases in which the difference between water
application and consumptive use is split between irretrievable losses (e.g., evaporative
losses) and return flow. The first term on the right-hand side of equation (3) subtracts
the quantity of irrigation water applied over the width of the river basin at x, and the
second term adds any irrigation return flows back into the river (6  > 0).
Differential equation (3) can be solved for the quantity of instream flows at x for fixed
values of irrigation deliveries, on-farm irrigation efficiency, and consumptive use. These
fixed values arise as each farm responds to a fixed water delivery price Pf. Each farm
determines  its profit-maximizing  level  of consumptive  water  use  (C)  according  to
equation (2), and the required water delivery (Qf) using equation (1) for a given level of
on-farm  irrigation efficiency  (Ef).  Inserting these fixed  values  into equation  (3)  and
solving for the level of instream flows at x yields:
(4)  W(x)=  WO  - Qfax  + 6(Qf - Cf)ax,
where W(x) is in units of acre-feet  of water. The quantity of instream flows at x is given
by the difference between  basin inflows  at the origin,  W(O),  and  accumulated water
deliveries applied over the width of the basin up to x (the second right-hand-side term).
If 0 <  < 1,  then instream flows are augmented  by the accumulated irrigation return
flows up to x (the third right-hand-side  term).
Model  Analysis
We now analyze the hydro-economic model defined by equations (1),  (2), and (4) to inves-
tigate whether increased water prices lead to agricultural water savings under a range
of hydrologic  circumstances  prevailing  in the West.  We  implicitly differentiate  each
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equation with respect to the water rate P, and evaluate the derivatives at a status quo
flat water  price of Pf = P1. Forward substitution is used to solve for aW(x)/OP, which
summarizes whether instream flows increase or decrease after each farm has adjusted
optimally to an incremental increase in water rates from P1. A positive (negative) value
for dW(x)/OP indicates that farmer adjustments to an increased water price result (do not
result) in water conservation.
The derivative of consumptive use equation (1) with respect to P is:
aC  aQ  OE (5)  .=  E(P1)  + Q(P1) OP  ap  aP  '
where the marginal  change in on-farm irrigation efficiency  with respect to the water
price is assumed to be positive, i.e.,  9E/OP > 0. This restriction is consistent with the
expectations  of water  administrators  in recommending  tiered  water  pricing:  "The
primary goal for irrigation  districts embracing  water demand  management is to get
farmers to increase their water use efficiencies to assure supplies for other purposes or
future needs" (U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, p. 10). It is also consistent with the available
empirical  evidence.  For  example,  farmers  in California's  Broadview Water  District
increased their on-farm irrigation efficiencies in response to increasing block prices for
delivered water with "shortened furrow lengths, reduced set times, and alternate-furrow
application during some irrigations" (Wichelns, p. 288).
Equation (5) can be reexpressed conveniently in elasticity form as:
(6)  c  (eQ,  p+  Ep  ) , OP  P1
where  eQp =  (P/Q)dQ/OP is  the price  elasticity  of demand  for water  deliveries,  and
cE,  =  (P/E)dE/aP  > 0 is the elasticity of demand for investment in improved on-farm
irrigation efficiency  with respect  to the water price  (referred  to below  as the "price
elasticity of irrigation efficiency").
The derivative of demand equation  (2) with respect to P is:
(7)  PyFc  = 1,
OP
or after substituting in equation (6):
PyFccC(P 1)
(8)  (eQ,p +  eE,p  ) 1.
P1
Solving for the price elasticity of delivered water (ep)  in equation (8) yields:
P1
(9)  CO,P - P  C1)  - EEp  < 0,
PyFCCC(P,)
which is negative because Fcc < 0, and eEp > 0 by assumption.
Finally, the derivative of volumetric instream flow equation (4) with respect to P can
be shown to be:
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aw,  _  Q(P1 )  C(P1 )  C(P1)
(10)  - =  (1-  6)  +6  1 Q  P  x - 6-  E,pcX.
L  P1  1  1
In the absence of irrigation return flows (6  = 0), equation (10) collapses  to:
(11)  W- = Q(Pl  )  ,  plx > 0.
OP  P1
Water delivered from the river and applied to crops is forever lost to the river. Hence,
a price-induced reduction in demanded water deliveries increases instream flows, and
constitutes water savings that increase at a rate proportional  to the price elasticity of
demand for delivered water.
In the absence of irretrievable water losses (6 = 1), equation (10) collapses to:
aw  (  .)  x,
(12)  - x - ,p  |  EP)  - ax,
OP  P1
which  is  negative  for  cEp >  IeQpI,  positive  for  eEp  <  IeQPI,  and  zero  for  Ep =  |IQP.
Because  the portion of water deliveries unconsumed in crop production returns to the
river, water loss only occurs through consumptive use. Thus, the rate at which instream
flows change in response to an increased water rate is inversely related to the response
of consumptive water use. Consumptive use increases (and instream flows decrease) in
response to a price increase when the price elasticity of delivered water is less in abso-
lute value than the price elasticity of irrigation efficiency. Alternatively,  consumptive
water use decreases  (and instream flows  increase) when the inequality holds  in the
opposite direction. Consumptive use and instream flows remain at constant levels when
the elasticities are offsetting.
Finally, if the  difference  between water application  and  consumptive  use is split
between irretrievable losses and irrigation return flows (0 < 6 < 1), then a price-induced
reduction in demanded water deliveries is increasingly apt to result in greater instream
flows as the proportion of irretrievable water losses increases (i.e., as 6 - 0) by equation
(10).
Discussion
As  described  above,  the water  policy literature  commonly  presumes  that increased
prices for delivered water lead to agricultural water savings at levels directly related to
the price elasticity of delivered water. Our analysis demonstrates that this presumption
is indisputable  only for the polar case in which the portion of water deliveries uncon-
sumed by crops is irretrievably lost to the river basin. In the absence of irrigation return
flows, instream flows are reduced by the amount of water delivered from the river to the
farm, and this reduction depends on the farmer's price elasticity for delivered water.
In reality, irrigation return flows constitute a significant component of instream flows
in the West (see, e.g., Hydrosphere Resource Consultants). In the presence of irrigation
return flows, instream flows decrease by the portion of the delivery that is consump-
tively used and irretrievably lost, and this significantly complicates the linkage between
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delivered water rates and conservation.  Consumptive water use is directly related to
both the demanded water delivery and on-farm irrigation efficiency, but increased water
prices have opposite impacts on these two components. As prices increase, the farmer
reduces  the  demand  for  delivered  water  according  to the  price  elasticity  of water
delivery  (depressing  consumptive  use),  but  increases  the  portion  of  the  delivery
consumed in crop production by improving on-farm irrigation efficiency according to the
price elasticity of irrigation efficiency.  Whether these countervailing impacts combine
to reduce consumptive water use and increase instream flows is an empirical question
depending on the relative magnitudes of the two elasticities.
In sum, the common presumption linking increased water rates to water conservation
as a function only of the price elasticity of delivered water is unrealistic for general
western hydrologic conditions and, as a consequence, is overly simplistic. It can give rise
to a false expectation of water conservation in the presence of return flows when, in the
worst-case scenario,  consumptive water use actually increases if the price elasticity of
irrigation efficiency predominates  over the price  elasticity of delivered water. Under
these circumstances,  water demand management  backfires and exerts more pressure
on scarce water supplies.
Should  irrigation  districts  continue  to  adopt  tiered  pricing  structures  based  on
delivery  quantities  despite  the  possibility  that such  structures  may  generate  false
expectations of water conservation or, worse yet, exacerbate scarcity? Irrigation districts
base their water rates on water deliveries because measuring and monitoring a farm's
consumptive use is generally more costly (Gould). The opportunity cost of achieving this
cost efficiency in conservation pricing schemes is that the impacts of increased delivery
rates on consumptive water use and conservation may be ambiguous, and these ambi-
guities  can  only  be  resolved empirically.  Alternatively,  the  benefit of incurring the
increased  costs  of pricing  water  according  to consumptive  use  is  that farmers  are
expected to unambiguously reduce water consumption, which is often the major means
of generating water savings in western hydrologic systems. In short, irrigation districts
must weigh increased measurement and monitoring costs against the public pressure
to guarantee true agricultural water savings in determining whether to shift pricing to
a consumptive  use basis.
Conclusion
Increasing block water prices for delivered water are commonly presumed to lead to
agricultural water conservation in amounts depending on the price elasticity of demand.
Our analysis demonstrates that this presumption  is overly simplistic for the irrigation
return flow hydrologic systems characterizing the West. Under return flow conditions,
increasing block prices encourage farms to reduce demanded irrigation deliveries, but
also increase  the efficiency  with which the reduced  deliveries  are  consumed in crop
production.  These  adjustments  have  countervailing  impacts  on  agricultural  water
conservation, and thus transform the commonly presumed theoretical certainty of water
savings from increased water prices to an empirical uncertainty.  This uncertainty can
be resolved by assessing water price in terms of consumptive water use instead of water
deliveries. However, assuming that irrigation districts will continue to price water based
on delivery, agricultural economists can aid public policy makers in predicting the water
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conservation potential of tiered pricing schemes in a given region by producing empirical
estimates of the price elasticities regulating the above countervailing adjustments.
On a final note, we should recognize that tiered water pricing is used for purposes
other  than water  conservation.  For  example,  it  is used  successfully  in California's
Broadview Water District to encourage farmers to reduce toxic irrigation return flows
as part of a regional plan for implementing state water quality guidelines (Wichelns;
Wichelns and Cone). This is consistent with our analysis because, although the afore-
mentioned farm adjustments to increasing water prices have countervailing impacts on
water conservation, they act in concert to reduce irrigation return flows. The implication
for water policy is that tiered water pricing may trigger a tradeoff of water quality for
water quantity benefits which must be  recognized and managed optimally to ensure
regionwide economically  efficient water management.
[Received August 1997; final revision received January  1998.]
References
Chakravorty, U.,  E. Hochman,  and D. Zilberman.  "A Spatial Model of Optimal Water  Conveyance."
J. Environ. Econ. and Manage. 29(July 1995):25-41.
Gould, G. "Water Rights Transfers and Third-Party Effects." Land and Water Law Rev. 23(1988):1-41.
Hydrosphere Resource Consultants. "Water Supplies to Promote Juvenile Anadromous Fish Migration
in the Snake River Basin: A Report to the National Marine Fisheries Service." Boulder CO, 1991.
Michelsen, A.,  R. Taylor,  T. McGuckin,  and R. Huffaker. "Emerging Price Conservation  Programs in
Agricultural Water Use." Paper presented at annual meetings of the Western Agricultural Economics
Association,  Reno NV, July 1997.
U.S. Bureau  of Reclamation.  "Incentive Pricing Handbook  for Agricultural  Water Districts." Report
prepared by Hydrosphere  Resource Consultants, Boulder CO,  1997.
Whittlesey, N., B. McNeal, and V. Obersinner.  "Concepts Affecting Irrigation Management." In Energy
and WaterManagement  in Western IrrigatedAgriculture,  ed., N. Whittlesey, pp. 101-28. Boulder CO:
Westview Press, Inc.,  1986.
Wichelns, D. "Increasing Block-Rate Prices for Irrigation Water Motivate  Drain Water Reduction." In
The Economics and Management of Water and Drainage in Agriculture, eds.,  A.  Dinar  and D.
Zilberman, pp. 275-94. Boston: Kluwer Academic  Publishers,  1991.
Wichelns,  D., and  D.  Cone.  "Tiered Pricing Motivates  Californians  to Conserve Water." J. Soil and
Water Conserv. 47(1992):139-44.
Willey, Z.,  and A. Diamant.  "Using Water Prices to Encourage  Conservation:  The Design and Evalu-
ation of Water Rates for Irrigation Districts in Washington State." Study commissioned by State of
Washington,  prepared by Environmental  Defense Fund, New York,  1995.
Huffaker et al.